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Abstract— Wireless Sensor Network (WSN) is consisting of 
independent and distributed sensors to monitor physical or 
environmental conditions, such as temperature, sound, 
pressure, etc. However, the limited resources of sensors and 
hostile environments in which they could be deployed, make 
this type of networks vulnerable to several types of attacks 
similar to those occurring in ad hoc networks. The most crucial 
and fundamental challenge that WSN is facing is security. The 
primary subject of all my work is to address this issue. Due to 
minimum capacity in-term of memory cost, processing and 
physical accessibility to sensors devices the security attacks are 
problematic. They are mostly deployed in open area so are 
more exposed to different kinds of attacks. They must be 
designed in a way to successfully recover itself from different 
kinds of attacks. In this paper, we proposed a new lightweight 
cryptography algorithm based on LEAP+. Our evaluations on 
TOSSIM give a precise and detailed idea of the extra cost of 
consumption of resources needed to ensure the high level of 
expected security. 
Index Terms— Wireless Sensor Network, Cryptography, key 
management, key establishment, LEAP+ 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Inexpensiveness, energy efficiency, and consistency in 
performance is the need of the day for electronic 
communication. This has led to the advancement of wireless 
technologies and micro-electro-mechanical systems (MEMS). 
Which in turn made it possible to make low power tiny devices 
that runs autonomously. Which evolve a new class of 
distributed networking named wireless sensor networks 
(WSNs) [1] [2].  
Today we find this kind of network in a wide range of 
potential applications, including security and surveillance, 
control, actuation and maintenance of complex systems and 
fine-grain monitoring of indoor and outdoor environments. 
The majority of these applications are deployed to monitor an 
area and to have a reaction when they register a critical event. 
The data does not need to be confidential in areas such as 
capturing indoor and outdoor environmental events. However, 
the confidentiality of data can be essential in other 
applications, Security is the most important issue for WSN 
because of the fact of its application. It can be setup in a very 
critical systems for example in hospitals, airports, military 
applications, burglar alarms, environment control, smart 
homes and traffic surveillance. The classic security 
mechanism has to be avoided in WSN due to limited 
constraints. It is therefore challenging to come up with a new 
technique that address the issue while keeping in mind the 
limitations of WSN that we have discussed in the introduction 
chapter. It's really important for security to know which 
specific thing should be protected and in in which way to 
protect. Sensor networks are vulnerable against external and 
internal attacks due to their unique characteristics like 
- They can be physically access, they are mostly 
deployed in an open area so any machine or human user 
can easily reprogram or destroy them. 
- The sensor nodes are limited with computation, 
communication, memory and power capabilities 
which make it difficult to use cryptographic 
algorithms and protocols for the required security 
services. 
- As the communication channels is public so any external 
or internal device can have access to the information 
exchange. 
- The monitoring and control of the actual states of the 
elements of the network is difficult due to the inherent 
distributed nature of sensor networks. A failure or the cause 
of failure in any elements may remain hidden. In order to 
achieve this in the next section chapter we will present 
cryptographic primitives and models for WSN in literature. 
The paper is structured as following. In the next section, we 
present in related work. Section 3 discus security model for 
WSNs. Section 4 describes proposed model to secure the 
global key. In the Section 5, we present performances analyses 
and discussion of our scheme. Finally, the paper ends with a 
conclusion and future works. 
II. RELATED WORKS
At present, there are many security schemes designed for 
general ad hoc network, but very few for wireless sensor 
network specifically. In this section, we describe three typical 
security protocols for sensor network and summarize their 
features.  
 Perig et al [3] proposed SPINS protocol which is a suite of 
security building blocks proposed. It is optimized for resource 
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constrained environments and wireless communication. 
SPINS has two secure building blocks: SNEP and μTESLA.  
SNEP  uses a shared counter between the two communicating 
parties and applies the  counter  in calculating encryption and 
a message authentication  code (MAC) to  provides data 
confidentiality, semantic security, data integrity, two-party 
data authentication, replay protection,  and  weak  message  
freshness. What’s more, the protocol also has low 
communication overhead, for the counter state is kept at each 
end point and the protocol only adds 8 bytes per message. For 
applications requiring strong freshness, the sender creates a 
random nonce (an unpredictable 64-bit value) and includes it 
in the request message to the receiver. The receiver generates 
the response message and includes the nonce in the MAC 
computation. μTESLA provides authenticated broadcast for 
severely resource-constrained environments. μTESLA 
constructs authenticated broadcast from symmetric primitives, 
but introduces asymmetry with delayed key disclosure and 
one-way function key chains. SPINS realizes an authenticated 
routing application and a security two-party key agreement 
with SNEP and μTESLA separately with low storage, 
calculation and communication consumption. However, 
SPINS still have some underlying problems. Due to use the 
pairwise key pre-distribution scheme in the security routing 
protocol, SPINS rely on the base station excessively.  
 Deng et al. [4] suggested an Intrusion-tolerant routing 
protocol for wireless sensor networks (INSENS).  This 
protocol leverages some concepts of SPINS to implement 
intrusion-tolerant multi-hop routing for WSNs. For example, 
we utilize keyed message  authentication  codes  (MAC)  
similar  to  SNEP  to verify  the  integrity  of  control packets. 
We also employ the concept of a one-way hash chain seen in 
μTESLA, but use the chain to provide one-way sequence 
numbers for loose authentication  of  the  base  station,  rather  
than  as  the  key release  mechanism seen  in SPINS. In 
addition, INSENS limits flooding of messages by allowing 
communication only between the base station and the sensor 
nodes, and by having sensor nodes drop duplicate messages. 
These techniques essentially limit the damage an intruder may 
cause. Together, these design choices ensure that an intruder 
may be able to take out a small part of the network, but cannot 
compromise the entire network. What’s more, INSENS 
minimizes computation by performing all heavy-duty 
computations at the base station(s) and minimizing the role of 
sensor nodes in building routing tables, or dealing with 
security and intrusion-tolerance issues. Although INSENS 
limits the damage in the area around the invaders or the 
downstream area of the invaders, the damage range  still  will  
be  very  big  when  the  internal  attackers  are around the 
base station.  
 Zhu et al  proposed LEAP (Localized Encryption and 
Authentication Protocol) [5] protocol for sensor networks that 
is  designed to support  in-network  processing,  while at the 
same time restricting the security impact of a node 
compromise to the immediate network neighborhood of the 
compromised node. The design of the protocol is motivated by  
the  observation that different types of  messages exchanged  
between  sensor  nodes  have  different security requirements, 
and that a single  keying  mechanism  is  not suitable for 
meeting these different security requirements.    
 Hence, LEAP supports the establishment of four types of 
keys for each sensor node-an individual key shared with the 
base station, a pairwise key shared with another sensor node, a 
cluster key shared with multiple neighboring nodes, and a 
group key that is shared by all the nodes in the network. The 
protocol used for establishing and updating these keys is 
communication and energy efficient, and minimizes the 
involvement of the base station. LEAP also includes an 
efficient  protocol  for  inter-node  traffic authentication based 
on  the  use  of  one-way  key  chains.  A salient  feature  of  
the protocol  is  that  it  supports  source  authentication  
without precluding  in-network  processing  and  passive  
participation. LEAP adopts different types of key to different 
network protocol message packages, and therefore can support 
multiple communication mode. What’ more, this protocol 
weakens the role of base station. The  main  defect  of  the 
protocol  is  that  the  protocol  increases  overhead  traffic,  
the failure of single point is serious, and the storage capacity is 
large.  Besides, LEAP is inefficient in the formation and 
update of cluster key. What’ more, the HELLO news in the 
network is written in plaintext rather than ciphertext, which 
may lead nodes to respond to invalid news and waste node 
resources. 
 The diagrams SPINS and LEAP use master keys in the key 
establishment. Which reduces the storage key in the memory 
nodes. However, resistance to attacks is low. Because the 
master key can be compromised at any time, set the key after 
deployment using this key can be compromised too. By 
adopting a symmetrical system, they are the most suitable and 
among the fastest in terms of calculation. Note that the 
symmetrical patterns are expensive in operations (if any) as 
key renewal and revocation using secret keys to exchange 
other secret keys. The problem is easier in asymmetrical 
patterns since the public key does not need to be secret.  
III. THE PROPOSED MODEL 
In the previous chapters it has been tried to give a general 
description of some of the state of the art algorithms available 
in the literature. It can be concluded that sensor network 
nodes are mostly deployed in unattended adversarial 
environment for example battlefield. Therefore it is extremely 
important for the applications of many sensor networks to 
have a security mechanism which provide authentication and 
confidentiality. The unique issue that needs to be considered 
in sensor network before selecting a key sharing approach is 
its impact on the effectiveness of in-network processing. The 
proposed algorithm support in-network processing and also 
provide security properties similar to those provided by 
pairwise key sharing schemes. Similar to leap+ and other 
protocol the proposed solution is also based on the 
observation that different types of messages exchanged 
between sensor nodes have different security requirements 
which leads us to the conclusion that a single keying 
mechanism is not suitable for meeting these different security 
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requirements. Like leap+ the proposed algorithm also support 
the establishment of four different types of keys: 
 Individual key: Shared with the base station 
 Pairwise key: Shared with another sensor node 
 Cluster key: With multiple neighboring nodes it is 
shared 
 Global key: Shared by all nodes in the network 
3.1 Assumption in-term of network and security 
The following important assumption has been 
made while studying and designing the protocol 
 A static sensor network where nodes are not 
mobile 
 The base station work as a controller 
 The power supplied to the base station is supplied 
with long-lasting power 
 All nodes are equal in computational and 
communication capabilities 
 Every node has enough space to store hundred of 
bytes of keying materials 
 Nodes installation can be done both either through 
aerial scattering physical installation. 
 In advance The immediate neighboring nodes of 
any sensor node are not known 
 All the information a node holds becomes known 
to the attacker If it is compromised 
 Attacks of the physical layer and media access 
control layer are not  considered 
The security requirements for each type of packets are 
different. Authentication is required for all types of packets 
whereas confidentiality is required for some types of packets. 
As it has been explained that a single keying mechanism is 
not appropriate for all the secure communications needed in 
sensor networks. So the algorithm support four types of keys 
for each sensor node: 
3.2 Key Management 
3.2.1 Individual Key 
To have secure communication between the node and the 
base station this key is used. Every node in the network have 
its own individual key. Individual key is also important in the 
sense that it can be used to compute the message 
authentication code if the message is to be verified by the 
base station. This can be also used to send alert to the base 
station if there is any abnormal behavior observed. Base 
station can use individual key to encrypt any sensitive 
information such as keying material or special instructions to 
individual node. It is important to mention that individual key 
is preloaded into the network before deployment [6]. The 
individual key is generated as follows: 
IKu = fKm (u) 
Where IKu is the individual key, f is a pseudo-random 
function, Km is the master key, and u is any node for which 
we want to find individual key. 
It is is also possible to save storage needed to keep all the 
individual keys the controller might only keep its master key. 
It compute the individual key on the fly when needed. The 
individual key has been find by encrypting the node id with 
the global key (master key) by using Advance encryption 
standard algorithm. 
3.2.2 Establishing Pairwise keys 
The most important step is to have pairwise key between 
nodes. It is very important from the security point of view as 
if the key is compromised its effect is localized. The pairwise 
key is shared between one-hop neighbors. A sensor node 
communicate with its immediate neighbor through pairwise 
key. The important assumption made to establish pair wise 
keys are: 
  Node doesn't know its neighbor pairwise key before 
deployment. Pairwise key is created after 
deployment 
  The nodes of the network are stationary nodes 
  A node that is added to the network will discover 
most of its neighbors at the time of deployment. 
The pairwise is generated by following these steps: 
1- Key Predistribution 
An initial key generated by the controller is loaded to each 
node. Each node then derive its master key as: 
Ku = fKin (u) 
Where Ku is the master key generated by the node u, f is a 
pseudo-random function, Kin is the initial key, and u is any 
node for which we want to derive the master key. 
2- Neighbor Discovery 
 Every node try to find its neighbor by broadcasting a HELLO 
message. This Hello message contains id of the node. Also a 
timer is started which fires after time Tmin. This node then 
wait for any node v which respond tho this HELLO with an 
ack message having the id of the node v. Ack from neighbor is 
authenticated using master key kv. The master key is derived 
as:  
Kv = fKin (v) 
Where Kv is the master key of node v, f is a pseudo-random 
function, kin is the initial key, and v is any node that want to 
find its master key. 
3- Pairwise key Establishment 
Any two nodes between the network let say node u and v 
compute the pairwise key as: 
Kuv = fKv (u) 
Where kuv is the pairwise key between node u and v, f is a 
pseudo-random function, kv is the master key of node, and u 
is the node id of any node u. 
4- Key Erasure  
When the timer expires after Tmin, node u erases Kin and all 
the master keys of its neighbor which was computed during 
the neighbor discovery phase. 
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3.2.3 Establishing cluster Keys 
       Cluster key is established between a node and all its 
neighbors. Using cluster key a node encrypt broadcast 
message. To establish the cluster key any node u generate a 
random key and then encrypt this random key with the 
pairwise key already generated. Then the generated cluster 
key is transmitted to each neighbors. 
3.2.4 Global key establishment  
       A key shared by the base station and every node is the 
global key. It is important and is used when the base station 
(controller) want to generate a confidential message. 
3.3 Defense against Various Attacks 
       Routing control information is authenticated by the 
local broadcast authentication scheme which prevent most of 
the outsider attacks. The possible attacks an adversary may 
launch in the hope of creating routing loops, repelling or 
attracting network traffic or generating error messages are 
 Spoof 
 Alter 
 Replay routing information 
 Selective forwarding Attack 
 HELLO Flood Attack 
 Node cloning Attack 
      This scheme may not prevent the adversary from 
launching these attacks, however; it can thwart or minimize 
their consequences. The local broadcast authentication scheme 
makes these attacks possible only in a one-hope neighbor and 
hence the effect is strictly localized. This localizing effect also 
help in detecting these kinds of attacks. The alter attack can 
also be detected as the sending node may overhear the message 
being altered during its forwarding stage by the compromised 
node. It is also interesting to mention that if a node is 
compromised and is detected the re-keying scheme can 
efficiently revoke the node from the network. The hello flood 
attack is also possible in which an adversary may try to send a 
HELLO message to every node with a high transmission power 
so that it convince all the nodes that it is their neighbor. Here 
the Hello flood attack will not be succeeded beyond the 
neighbor discovery phase because every node accepts packets 
only from neighbors who are authenticated. The same is the 
case with node cloning attack it cannot go beyond the neighbor 
discovery phase. 
3.4 Proposed model to secure the global key 
The critical assumption that leap+ has considered is that 
within Tmin a node cannot be compromised. This idea seems 
practical but only in an extreme ideal condition. There is 
possibility that Tmin would in reality be greater than the one 
assumed. As an example if nodes are dropped and scattered 
from airplanes, the scattered nodes may arrive in different 
parts of the network at different times even if dropped 
simultaneously and hence will need some time to setup the 
network and exchange pairwise key. Taking the advantage of 
this an adversary may observe a node and obtains the key and 
if the global key is compromised the whole network becomes 
at risk. Since this is a very serious threat to security different 
algorithms has been studied and proposed a model that detect 
the compromised node and take necessary action to delete the 
compromised node from the network [7] [8] [9] [10] [11]. 
Some of the algorithms available in literature to detect 
compromise nodes are:   
 Detecting Compromised Nodes in Wireless Sensor 
Network by Rick Mckenzie, Min song, Mary 
Mathews, sachin shetty, 
 A Framework for identifying Compromised Nodes 
in sensor Network by Qing Zhang, Ting Yu, Peng 
Ning 
 Malicious Node Detection in wireless sensor 
Networks using by Idris M.Atakli, Hongbing Hu, Yu 
chen 
 Sensor Node Compromise Detection, The location 
Perspective by Hui song and liang xie 
To resolve this problematic, we propose a very simple and 
straight forward model, where the complexity has been 
reduced to maximum and the global key security is ensured 
up-to a greater extent. In this model a sequence number has 
been added to every node before deployment. This sequence 
number or nod specific number is used to find if an adversary 
has taken the advantage of the key establishment time and 
have added its own node to get information of the network. 
After the pairwise keys are established the Generator or the 
base station (who have already the information of every node 
deployed) send a request to the network and ask for its 
sequence number, every node send its sequence number to the 
base station. Using this information to the previously stored 
information if the result is positive it stay silent. If a 
compromised node is detected it send a broadcast message 
informing all the nodes about the compromised node. 
Base station
Request
Result 
positive = 
Stay silent
Sequence 
Number
Sequence 
Number
Result Negative = 
Broadcat MSG
Compromised 
node Found
 
Fig.1. Proposed Model schematic Diagram 
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IV. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS 
TOSSIM is used to simulate the Entire TinyOS 
applications. The goal is to achieve accurate and scalable 
simulation of TinyOS application. TOSSIM is a TinyOS 
library which work by replacing components with simulation 
implementations [12] [13].The key requirements for a TinyOS 
simulator are: 
 Bridging 
The simulator must work as bridge between the algorithm 
and implementation. It must provide developer to verify and 
test the code which then will run on real hardware. 
 completeness 
Completeness in-term of covering maximum possible 
system interactions and also accurately capturing behavior at 
a wide range of levels. 
 Fidelity 
The simulator must have the capability to capture the 
behavior of the network at a fine grain. It is important to 
check the timing interactions on a mote and between motes 
both for evaluation and testing. 
 Scalability 
The simulator must have the capability of handling large 
networks of thousands of nodes in a wide range of 
configurations. 
5.1 Performance analysis 
5.1 Pairwise key generation Time Analysis 
     As the time available for the generation of pairwise key 
is short therefore the time for the successful generation of the 
pairwise key with different nodes model has been analyzed. 
The main interest was to check if the density of network has 
any effect in the successful generation of pairwise key with in 
the available time. Interestingly it has been noticed that the 
algorithm successfully generate pairwise key on different node 
model within the available time. It has been also noticed that 
each pair of neighbor successfully generate the same pairwise 
key that is uniquely identified to the specific pair of nodes. The 
experiment has been performed with a difference of two, five 
and ten nodes repeatedly ten times each. Almost the same 
result has been noticed for each experimental model with 
successful generation of the pairwise key. 
 
 Performed with a difference of 10 nodes ten times 
repeatedly 
 
Fig .3. Pairwise key generation time analysis 
5.2 Individual key generation Time analysis 
The most important task was to check the successful 
completion of pairwise key generation. Apart from that the 
time for generation of individual keys for different node 
models has also been analyzed. It has been confirmed that 
each pair of node successfully generate a unique individual 
key. 
 Performed with a sample to 20 Nodes 
 
Fig .5. Individual key generation Time analysis 
CONCLUSION 
Security is the most important issue for wireless sensor 
networks because of the fact of its applications. It can be setup 
in a very critical systems for example in hospitals, airports, 
military applications, burglar alarms, environment control, 
smart homes and traffic surveillance. The main focus of this 
work is to address the issue of security in WSNs. Classic 
security mechanism has to be avoided in WSNs due to limited 
constraints. Thus it has been concluded to use symmetric 
shared key schemes. One of the important observation for any 
type of key-management scheme is that a single keying 
mechanism is not suitable for meeting different security 
requirements. During this work different state of the art 
algorithms has been studied in depth for the proposal of a key-
management scheme based on symmetric shared keys. The 
rapid growth of WSNs in different areas especially critical 
system is attracting a large number of researchers to work on 
its security. 
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